in welfare at the reversion points, or the best alternative to a negotiated agreement. 3 Let's call this the "BATNA" for short.
Suppose I am considering buying a bottle of water. If I am in a grocery store, and notice that the price is $1,000 per bottle, I laugh and push my cart along. I'll buy the water somewhere else, or get some from the tap, or choose any of many alternatives. I am almost indifferent, in fact, between buying water at Kroger or buying it at Food Lion, for the market price of $0.90. I have choices.
And, I have money, and we all agree that I own that money and can transfer, and we all agree that each store owns the water, and can transfer it. Finally, the water is not poisonous, and tastes good, so I won't regret purchasing it, if I choose to do so. So the exchange is euvoluntary. Now, let's suppose instead that I am far out in the desert, and am dying of thirst. I happen to have quite a bit of cash on me, but I can't drink that. A four wheel drive taco truck rolls over the hill, and pulls up to me. I see that the sign advertises a special: "3 tacos for $5! Drinks: $1,000. 3 drinks for only $2,500"
I argue with the driver. "Have a heart, buddy! I am dying of thirst!" He asks if I have enough money to pay his price, and I admit that I do. The driver shrugs, and says, "Up to you! Have a nice day!" and starts to drive off.
I stop him, and buy 3 bottles of water for the "special" price of $2,500. Was the exchange euvoluntary?
It was not. The exchange violates part 5 of the definition, relative equality of BATNAs. My BATNA was death, from thirst. The driver was little affected by whether a deal was consummated (though he got a bit richer), while I was enormously affected. Even though in most important senses the exchange was voluntary (I could have said no), it was not euvoluntary. The precise definitional line between almost equal BATNAs (and therefore euvoluntary exchange) and unequal BATNAs
The (In)Justice of Euvoluntary Exchange, (and therefore not euvoluntary exchange) may be hard to draw, but I hope the distinction is clear enough for analytic purposes.
Let me drive one stake, a marker for this stage in argument, because we will come back and find it. Did the driver make me worse off? What if high prices for water were outlawed, by the kind of "anti-gouging" laws common in many U.S. states, and he had stayed home? Would anyone seriously argue that having access to a market, even if the exchange was not euvoluntary, made me worse off? To remind the reader, my sustained thesis in this paper is that the objection to market exchange as unjust always depends on a disparity in BATNAs. But that disparity rests on conditions that preceded market exchange, rather than being caused by access to the exchange. Market exchange always reduces the disparity in outcomes, even if it is not euvoluntary.
The Mancgere and Wilt Chamberlain
To clarify euvoluntary exchange, and the claims about its justice or injustice, let us consider someone whose entire livelihood is derived from negotiating and consummating exchanges-the "middleman." A middleman is a trader who buys as cheaply as possible, and then sells dear, doing nothing-absolutely nothing-in the meantime to improve the product being sold. Middlemen are everywhere, and probably have been since the very first series of repeated and routinized exchanges.
Traders on the "Spice Road" were middlemen. So is EBAY, today.
The roots of the English word "monger," a common merchant or seller of items are quite old.
In Saxon writings of the 11 th century, described in Sharon Turner's magisterial three-volume History of the Anglo-Saxons (1836), we find a very striking passage 4 where a merchant (mancgere) defends himself on moral grounds. "Skins, silks, costly gems, and gold; various garments, pigment, wine, oil, ivory, and orichalcus, copper, and tin, silver, glass, and Quite a story, actually-risk, greed, adventure, and profit. The mancgere openly admits he does nothing to change or improve the product. All he does is transport it, and then sell it at a much higher price. In fact, he consciously and unabashedly sets out to sell it at the highest price he can obtain.
Are these exchanges euvoluntary? Probably. Many of the items being resold are luxuries.
The buyers may be disappointed that they can't afford the costly baubles, but their physical situations are not harmed by being unable to consummate an exchange. And there is no reason to believe that the merchandise itself is shoddy or that the claims for its worth are fraudulent.
Suppose that the mancgere is very good at what he does, and works very hard. It is easy to imagine (since this happened in many cases in medieval Europe, the middle east, and Asia) that he and his sons might have built up a great trading empire, with enormous wealth. 5 But isn't it still true that since each separate exchange was (suppose, for the sake of argument) euvoluntary, then the result must also be just, and morally defensible. (Radford, 1945, p. 196-7) Note how naturally exchange would appear in such a setting of pure equality. If I like carrots more than milk, and you like milk more than carrots, we can trade. Because everyone has exactly the same endowment, trading is universally approved, and praiseworthy. There is no increase in the total amount of food in the area, but the total welfare of the group is improved. And people don't have to be told this. They recognize it quickly, on their own. As Radford puts it, in the prison camp, "Very soon after capture people realized that it was both undesirable and unnecessary, in view of the limited size and the equality of supplies, to give away or to accept gifts…'Goodwill' developed into trading as a more equitable means of maximizing individual satisfaction." Opponents of exchange, then would have to deal with the claim that trade is more equitable than relying on gifts. And the reason is that voluntary trades always leave both parties better off, whereas gifts rely on sacrifice.
The (In)Justice of Euvoluntary Exchange, It is important to extend Nozick's argument, from an existence proof based on many trades and a unique performer (Chamberlain) to a setting where only the "many trades" aspect is preserved.
In the prison camp setting, since each person had precisely the same initial endowment, but different preferences, allowing exchange made everyone better off. But there might be a difference between (a) value in use, where I exchange something I don't much want for something I want more, and (b) value in exchange, where I am exchanging for the sake of accumulating a surplus. 9 Why this might be a problem is rather paradoxical, however. If I make one trade, and I am better off, than no one begrudges the improvement, so long as my trading partner is also better off. We have finally arrived at the heart of the paradox that I led off with. The padre never made a fraudulent claim, or misrepresented what he was offering to trade. The commodities were standardized, and interchangeable (one tin of cheese is just like any other; cigarettes are machinemade, and indistinguishable, a tin of jam is always the same). At each and every step, in every transaction, the exchange with the padre made the other party better off. And yet…and yet the padre accumulated "profit" of a full Red Cross parcel, a small fortune in the setting of the camp.
Just like the Saxon "mancgere" in 1050 AD, the wandering padre created value. It might seem he only took value, buying cheap, selling dear, and changing or improving none of the products he exchanged. But in fact he created value, at every step in the process. He did this by finding A, who would pay 6 (or fewer) cigarettes for a tin of beef, and then finding another man B, who would sell a tin of beef for 3 (or more) cigarettes. Admittedly, if these two fellows met each other, they might have exchanged directly, and cut out the middleman. But finding just the right person to trade with, in a vast teeming prison camp, is hard. The mancgere/padre, by searching across trades, can arbitrage the difference: he sells the beef to A for 5 cigarettes, after buying it from B for four cigarettes. A is better off by at least one cigarette, and B is better off by at least one cigarette, and the padre "profits" one cigarette by finding the exchange opportunity.
The padre, by making many of these trades, was able to have everything he started with, plus another full parcel, a large amount of stuff. Yet, if you went back and asked every one of the trading It may take a moment to realize that the problem here is exactly the same as the problem of the itinerant padre. There are three ways of getting food from farm to market. First, every consumer goes off on his own, with a cart. This is inefficient and too slow to answer the needs of the hungry.
Second, middlemen can buy, transport, and resell the products. Third, the state can buy, transport, and resell the products, or give the products away for free.
Those concerned about equality might claim that the state can always perform the function of middlemen more because the motivation is public service, not by profit. And the state can always do it more cheaply because the costs of profit are not part of the process. But this is disastrously wrong.
First, agents of the state are not, in fact, motivated by the public interest. They are no better than anyone else, and act first to benefit themselves. Second, without the signals of price and profit provided by middlemen, no one knows what products should be shipped where, or when. In short, without middlemen, the state would act more slowly, less accurately, and at the wrong times.
Further, profit is crucial, and beneficial. It is because of profit that middlemen create value.
And the seeking of profit by middlemen, buying cheap and selling dear, ensures that, as Bastiat put it, the "wheat will reach the stomach" faster, more cheaply, and more reliably than any service the state could possibly create. (Bastiat, 1850, Chapter 6) The fact is that middlemen don't require perfect markets, or the conditions of perfect competition. Instead, middlemen are the means by which markets become "perfect." Arbitrage and In the Triangle (Raleigh, Durham, and Chapel Hill), more than a million people were without power the next morning. Thousands of homes were damaged by falling pines and powerful winds, and many roads were blocked by large fallen trees. Few residences had any kind of back-up power.
Within hours, food in refrigerators and freezers started to go bad. Insulin, baby formula, and other necessities immediately began to spoil heat. More than a million people needed ice. And they needed it now.
The Governor declared a state of emergency. One might think that thousands of entrepreneurs in the surrounding areas, little touched by the storm, would load trucks and head to the disaster area. After all, they owned, or could obtain, all the things that the residents of central North Carolina needed so desperately. Ice, chain saws, generators, lumber, tarps for covering gaping holes in roofs; these were just some of the needs.
But no such mass movement of resources to their highest valued use took place. North
Carolina had an "anti-gouging law," General Statute 75-36 10 , a law whose sole object was, in
Nozick's terms, to prohibit capitalist acts between consenting adults. The law had been interpreted to limit price increases to less than 5%. Each violation of this law could result in a fine of up to $5,000. So, ice that happened in Charlotte, stayed in Charlotte.
Why drive three hours to Raleigh when you can only charge the Charlotte price, plus just enough for gas money to break even?
The problem for Raleigh residents was all about price, at that point. The prices of all the necessities needed to "preserve, protect, or sustain" lives had shot up to infinity. Within a day after the storm, there were no generators, ice, or chain saws to be had, none. But that means that anyone who brought these commodities into the crippled city, and charged less than infinity, would be providing an important service.
Some service was, in fact, on the way. 11 Four young men in the town of Goldsboro, an hour east of Raleigh and largely untouched by the storm, noticed that the freezers at the Circle P's, the Stop Marts, and the Handee Sluggos were brimming with ice. Convenience stores had stocked up, expecting a more easterly course for the storm. Now, there was an ice surplus in Goldsboro, and a shortage in Raleigh. These young men rented two small freezer trucks, paid $1.70 each for 500 bags of ice for each truck and set off, filled with a sense of charity and bathed in the sweet milk of human kindness.
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That's a fib. They were filled with greed, and they were only bringing the ice so they could make money. whatever reason, these young men were bringing in ice.
Our icemen came to the outskirts of Raleigh, and headed downtown. The path was blocked by fallen trees, but these young men were country folk. Country folk carry chain saws, big ones, probably even on dates. They rolled the cut logs off the road so their trucks (and, by the way, other cars and emergency vehicles) could pass.
One truck apparently parked in Five Points, near downtown, and another parked a bit west, near wealthy St. Mary's Street, and opened for business. I have not been able to find a definitive claim about price, but it was more than $8. On reaching the front of the line, some customers were angry that the price was so high, but almost no one refused to pay for the ice. Those who did refuse to pay simply reverted to their BATNA, same as before the trucks arrived.
Of course, the police must uphold the law, even the dumb ones (laws, not police). Someone must have made a call, because within an hour two Raleigh police cars and an unmarked car pulled up to the Five Points truck. The officers talked to the sellers, talked to some buyers, still holding their ice, and confirmed that the price was much higher than the "allowed" price of $1.75 (the cost of a bag of ice before the storm). The officers did their duty, and arrested the middlemen. Apparently the truck was then driven to the police impoundment lot in downtown Raleigh, as evidence. The ice may or may not have melted (accounts vary), but it certainly was not given out to citizens.
And now we are back to where I started: the citizens, the prospective buyers being denied a chance to buy ice... they clapped. Clapped, cheered, and hooted, as the vicious ice sellers were handcuffed and arrested. Some of those buyers had been standing in line for five minutes or more, 
Objections to Consequences are Really Objections to Preconditions
I have now sketched out a number of examples, certainly enough examples to be able to argue my point. It is true that the taco truck driver in the desert stood to make a lot of money selling me water. It is likewise true that the mancgere expected to make a large profit selling spices, gems, and silk, and that the itinerant padre was trying hard to accumulate extra cigarettes and food through his trades. Finally, the ice sellers were motivated by greed, not charity, in bringing ice to Raleigh.
But in every case the seller made the (potential) buyer better off. Still, the cases divide into two very different groups, according to whether the exchange was euvoluntary. Buying water in the desert, or buying ice after the hurricane, is not euvoluntary, because both needs were desperate.
Buying silk, rather than linen, or trading for treacle in the POW camp, are euvoluntary, because the alternative to a negotiated agreement, or trade, is much more equal.
Should we have anti-gouging laws? If a trade is not euvoluntary, should it be outlawed?
Those who would argue "yes" are confusing cause and effect, or so I am claiming. The disparity in conditions is a measure of need. Our emotional reaction is that the man in the desert should not have to pay $1,000 for a bottle of water; the people of Raleigh should not have to pay $11 for a bag of ice.
So we pass laws saying that they will not be able to do so. And we make moral objections to capitalism, and to market exchange, based on a belief that we are protecting citizens. But the effect of these laws is to force people to accept the BATNA that we wanted to avoid in the first place!
The (In)Justice of Euvoluntary Exchange, Without an incentive to search the desert for the thirsty, the taco truck driver would stay in town, at a busy corner. The traveler dies of thirst. Without an incentive to buy ice and truck it to the disaster zone, hurricane refugees must accept that the price of ice is infinity, because none is available.
Consequently, it is in those instances where market exchange is not euvoluntary that access to market exchange is most important. Anti-gouging laws, restrictions on organ sales, and other rules designed to suppress markets are based on the idea that the BATNA for the poor, the needy, and the desperate, is unacceptably low. But those laws then ensure that the unacceptable BATNA is the only possible outcome for those same people. Restrictions on market exchange reify and instantiate precisely the harms they purport to avoid. What is the basis for such confusion?
Liberal Objections to Capitalism
There are many objections to capitalism and exchange, and there are thorough reviews of this literature, both elsewhere and in this special issue. I will offer a brief summary, as a way of contrasting the objections with the argument so far. Karl Marx, in volume I of Capital especially, makes two distinct arguments-exploitation and the inequality.
The exploitation argument is based on the claim that wage labor alienates the product of labor from its true owner, and no compensation could be sufficient.
The second argument is more interesting, for my purposes at least. In Chapter 26 of Volume I, Marx asks why some men work, but own little capital, and others own large amounts of capital, but do little work.
We have seen how money is changed into capital; how through capital surplus-value is made,
and from surplus-value more capital. But the accumulation of capital presupposes surplusvalue; surplus-value presupposes capitalistic production; capitalistic production presupposes This argument is philosophically powerful and rhetorically clever. Marx is saying that defenders of capitalism explain inequality as a kind of "original sin." The sin was committed, not in the Garden of Eden, but when your dissolute ancestors decided to spend all their money in bars and brothels instead of investing it. Thus, while this generation may be blameless, their poverty can be morally justified, because the pitiless gods of capitalism visit the sins of the fathers upon the children.
12
The (In)Justice of Euvoluntary Exchange, Marx clearly believes that the wage / labor contract is not (in my terms) euvoluntary. The worker can only choose work, or starvation. Where the taco truck driver, or ice sellers, in my previous examples could charge arbitrarily high prices, the capitalist in Marx's example can pay arbitrarily low wages. Labor is coerced to work, at a price that enriches the wealthy and further impoverishes the laborer.
What this suggests, as I have maintained throughout, is that the objection to capitalism is not to the process of exchange itself. Presumably even Marx would see little objectionable in labor exchanges for wages among wealthy capitalists. The problem occurs when exchanges are negotiated among parties with profound differences in wealth and power. To repeat: even this objection is not a rejection of the justice of exchange, per se. It is an indictment of inequality, because the exchange is not euvoluntary.
But then I must repeat the second portion of my main argument: if inequality is the real problem, then markets and access to exchange reduces the problem, rather than making it worse.
When comfortable American college students rally to protest "sweat shops" in developing nations, their clearly stated objection is that workers should not have to work in those conditions. But outlawing sweat shops means those workers will not be able to work, at all. The reason for the conditions is inequality, not capitalism. And access to jobs, even sweat shop jobs, is the way to put the poorest societies on the long, steep stairway toward widely shared prosperity. 14 The (In)Justice of Euvoluntary Exchange, First, the "social minimum" is too small, and the income of the wealthy too large, to satisfy the Rawlsian "difference principle." Of course, for this claim to be persuasive, one has to credit the difference principle as a fundamental moral law. The objection is that the social minimum has nothing to do with justice, and instead is cynically calculated at just the minimum amount to forestall revolution. The poor are bought off, with a level of income just slightly greater than would make them indifferent between revolution and quiescence. In the rational choice literature, in fact, this is an explicit assumption in recent works such as Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) . So, the welfare of the poor is treated as a constraint to be satisfied rather than part of the objective function to be improved.
But this objection fundamentally misunderstands the nature of exchange. The poor in wealthy countries are, by nearly any material measure, better off than the wealthy in poor nations. The reason is that exchange makes both parties better off. Being denied access to exchange actually harms the poor more than the wealthy, since the wealthy are likely to have other means of satisfying their needs and wants.
The second major Rawlsian objection is an aggregate level claim, that inequality is unacceptable as a primitive value. The reason is that the political freedoms on which liberalism depends for its existence are ruled out by gross inequalities of income. These concentrations of economic power inevitably can be translated into concentrated, or at least disproportionate, political
The (In)Justice of Euvoluntary Exchange, power. Therefore, as the argument goes, inequality is inconsistent with liberal democracy, and the solution is to reduce inequality.
The problem with the argument is that it assumes a large, powerful, and dangerous government apparatus. It is perfectly true that an aggressive and intrusive government, with few restrictions on its power, is likely to be dominated by the wealthy. But why would this lead us to conclude, "So get rid of the wealthy"? Does it not follow at least as directly that the correct answer is "Limit and constrain the power of government to do damage to the rights of citizens"?
The debate recalls the humorous "Chicago Marxist" moniker that some have attached to
George Stigler, and the "Economic Theory of Regulation." A number of passages in Chicago-style literature on regulation sound as if they might have been written by Marx, since they emphasize that regulation will generally be created, or else later transformed, to benefit industry. But the solution of Marx was, "so, get rid of capitalism." The solution of Stigler, Peltzman, et al is "so, get rid of regulation, as it will generally make things worse." It makes no sense to say that we are scared of government so get rid of the rich. If you are scared of government, then get rid of government!
The third and final objection is that economic inequality in the unregulated market society is too great even to preserve economic freedom. Contrary to the myth of equal opportunity, citizens do not in fact have any reasonable prospect of bettering themselves or achieving great wealth. The wealthy are born wealthy, and capital is concentrated in only a few hands. Most workers have no substantial control over their own working conditions, and because capitalists control the banking system then those workers have no chance of obtaining the loans they need to compete with existing concentrated industries Finally, the fact that workers may own stocks in their retirement accounts or 401k's cannot solve the problem, because their voting rights are too diffuse, and the power of the elite board of directors too concentrated and aloof, to allow effective participation or real opportunity.
The (In)Justice of Euvoluntary Exchange, For some reason, I have encountered many opponents in debates who consider this objection to capitalism to be devastating, and in fact unanswerable. But the claim is absurd on its face. It is perfectly true that a system based on politics, or elitism, or power, such as racial domination or class conflict, might have just the sort of effects posited here. That would be to forget that capitalism is based on none of these things. Instead, it is based on self-interest, or more starkly, on greed.
Branch Rickey broke the color line in baseball not because he was an altruist, but because he was a notorious capitalist who considered every angle and sought out every advantage. The fact was that African-American baseball players, beginning with Jackie Robinson, had enormous talent and could be signed to contracts at prices much less than comparable white players. Black players were a bargain. A racist would, indeed, work to suppress black labor. But a capitalist motivated by profit will purchase labor of the highest quality at the lowest price. And in a competitive system even a racist cannot afford to indulge in racism, because he will go bankrupt.
The fact is that any system other than capitalism suppresses ambition and constrains social and economic mobility. Perhaps capitalism is the second worst system for fostering economic welfare, but only if all alternatives are tied for worst. Greedy bankers are happy to loan to small businesses that are likely to succeed; greedy venture capital lenders are happy to sign contracts with unknown inventors from Hicksville, people who lack an Ivy League education, if those lenders think they can loan money to those inventors.
That's not to say that there is no racism, no discrimination, because there is. But it exists only because our system is not fully capitalist. There are pockets of protection for banks and for prospective employers, protections that allow them to indulge preferences for prejudice. Competition and self-interest are the surest way of eliminating discrimination, not the cause of discrimination. 
Final Words
It is useful to reprise the main themes I have tried to advance. First, I inquired about the paradox of the aggregation of exchange, related to Nozick's justification of markets: if each
The (In)Justice of Euvoluntary Exchange, exchange is individually mutually praiseworthy, how can the results be blameworthy? More simply, if each exchange is good, how can all exchange be bad?
Next I sought to define a notion of exchange in which any trade or negotiated outcome would be morally acceptable. I called this concept "euvoluntary," or truly voluntary, exchange. Then this concept was used to argue that all objections to the morality and justice of the uses of voluntary market exchange are category mistakes. In fact, they are really objections to imbalances or excessive inequalities in the distribution of power and wealth.
Thus, I tried to argue two main points, using this apparatus. First, euvolunatry exchanges are always justified, and if consummated are always just. Second, and more important, even exchanges that are not euvoluntary are generally welfare improving, and they improve the welfare of the least well off most of all. The confusion that arises in judging exchanges that are not euvoluntary is understandable, but unfortunate. The observer, seeing the degree of inequality, or desperation of one of the parties to a potential exchange, is actually perceiving a disparity in levels of welfare of the respective BATNAs, or "Best Alternatives to a Negotiated Exchange." This disparity is a consequence of differences that come before exchange is contemplated, and are not caused by the exchange.
But the confused observer seeks to help the less well off party by outlawing the exchange.
The observer, believing that the party should not have to exchange on such terms, blunders in and dictates that the party should not be allowed to exchange on such terms. The problem is that this ensures that party is marooned at his grossly inferior BATNA, an outcome that access to exchange could have avoided. In short, interference with "capitalist acts among consenting adults" has effects exactly the opposite of its supposed intent.
